



April 6, 1959

**MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT**  
**April 6, 1959**

**Others present: Mr. Herter, Mr. Wadsworth**

Mr. Herter said he had brought Mr. Wadsworth so that he might have the benefit of the President's thinking before returning to the negotiations in Geneva. The President said that the key elements are as set out in his message to Macmillan and draft message to Khrushchev. Mr. Wadsworth might proceed along those lines. At this point Mr. Wadsworth left the meeting.

Governor Herter said that the NATO meetings had on the whole gone well. The German position complicated the development of a clear line of policy for the allies. He suggested that the President read a summary message, a copy of which he left, reporting national positions as expressed at the NATO sessions. Mr. Herter also said that Selwyn Lloyd had asked him how he visualized the Foreign Ministers meeting proceeding. Mr. Lloyd indicated that he considered his ideas on "thinning out" and on a new regime for Berlin as a fall-back position. He also indicated he was thinking of the possibility of having two Foreign Ministers meetings before the Summit Meeting -- the first for the purpose of laying out of the initial positions, and the second for shifting to the fall-back positions if necessary. The President did not think this a good plan, since it seems to accept the idea of a definite weakening as part of our intention. The President suggested that we should not make sharp delineations between a first position and a fall-back position but should keep the whole matter general. Mr. Herter felt, however, that we should make our first position with the Russians quite firm and clear. He thought we must keep the objective of reunification even if we approach it by phases.

The President thought we should stand on the principle that the German people must be reunited under basic plans which are acceptable both to the nations involved in the war and to the Germans themselves.


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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3-204

*MR 80-147 #1*

By *DJH* Date *3/4/81*

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Mr. Herter said that the NATO session had reached several rather clear conclusions -- not to abandon Berlin; to keep our troops in Berlin; to keep the routes to Berlin open; and to make progress toward reunification. There had been some desire to include a policy statement that British and U. S. troops must be maintained on the Continent (the Belgians in particular had desired this) but in the end this provision was omitted, since its inclusion would have indicated it to be a matter of question and debate. The President thought we should take the line that until practical agreements are reached that are acceptable to both East and West, we will not withdraw our troops from the Continent over the opposition of our European allies.

Mr. Herter said that Mr. Spaak had questioned the wisdom of relying on the right of occupation and conquest as the basis of our presence in Berlin. The President said he had always favored resting our presence there on our responsibilities to a conquered people under our protection. Mr. Herter agreed that we should use the formula of responsibility for protection. With regard to the relationship of the Berlin question to the U N, Mr. Herter said that the matter is quite fuzzy with the French in particular not desiring to go to the United Nations. Mr. Spaak had an interesting suggestion -- to reach agreement with the Soviets and to register that agreement with the United Nations. He added that Mr. Hammarskjold has indicated he wanted to come to Washington to talk to the State Department, and the President indicated agreement to this proposal.

Mr. Herter next discussed

I next raised with the President and the Secretary of State a proposal outlined to me by General White at Secretary McElroy's request for investigations and consultations within the United States looking toward the dispersal of SAC aircraft to a considerable number of civilian fields. Information about these consultations seems likely

PORTIONS EXEMPTED

E.O. 12065, Sec. 1-301(c)(d)

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to become public. Neither Mr. Herter nor the President had any objection, on the understanding that the matter will be treated as simply a further step in the dispersal program, and not linked to the Berlin situation.

Mr. Herter next raised with the President the question of Administration action on the recommendations of the Draper Committee. The President said he thought he would have to send up these recommendations. He noted that they are not expenditures in FY-60, but appropriations. He thought the Administration position should be developed within a week or so. I mentioned that Mr. Stans, who has some rather strong views on the matter, was back in town today.

Mr. Herter next recalled that Secretary Dulles had met with an "advisory committee" on disarmament questions several months ago. The membership of the committee was Lovett, McCloy, Gruenther, and Bedell Smith. He asked if he might convene the committee again, and the President approved his doing so.

Mr. Herter then asked when the President is planning to return from Augusta. The President said that it might be as late as April 19th. Mr. Herter said that Fidel Castro will be here on the 16th, and requested that the President consider delaying his return until the afternoon of April 20th. Mr. Herter said he is planning to be away for a few days' rest on 17-19 April and the President approved.

The President next referred to a request from the State Department that he have the President's of the various European community organizations (Coal and Steel Community, EURATOM, Common Market) both to his office and for a luncheon. He thought that it would be more appropriate to have only one session, which he thought should be a meeting in his office. He pointed out to Mr. Herter that these affairs, valuable as they are individually, can mount up and in fact get quite out of hand.

Mr. Herter concluded the meeting by saying that the President's Gettysburg speech had been superb in his opinion. It came at a most fortunate moment in relation to the NATO session and highlighted U. S. responsibilities and undertakings around the world.

A. J. Goodpaster  
Brigadier General, USA

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